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Anne L. Lehman
Each morning, you arrive at work and turn on
your personal computer. While the computer
beeps and changes screens, checking for viruses
and verifying that all is well in your computer
world, you pick up a stack of papers and begin to
review your mail. As you open and read the mate-
rial, the thought that someone else has already
read this mail never enters your mind. Of course
not. It's your mail. It's personal and private. Not
only would it be rude for someone to read your
mail, it is illegal. Satisfied that you have not
missed important deadlines, you turn again to
your computer, enter your user identification
number, enter your password, and decide to
check your e-mail. Same thing, right? It's mail,
sent to your personal electronic address, and pro-
tected by a password. It's personal, private, and it
would be rude for someone else to read it. Unfor-
tunately, reading employee e-mail, from a differ-
ent computer terminal and without your consent,
is technologically possible, entirely legal, and rou-
tinely practiced by employers to monitor their em-
ployees. Even those messages that have been "de-
leted" or "trashed" might not escape the eye of
the employer.
A survey of 301 companies in 1993 revealed that
I Charles Piller, Bosses With X-ray Eyes, MAcWORLD, July
1993, at 118, 120. The study additionally revealed, that when
the number of employees in a company reaches 1,000 em-
ployees, the percentage of respondents indicating that they
search employee files rises to thirty percent. Id.
2 Id. at 122.
3 Workers' Privacy Concerns Grow as Electronic Snooping,
Urine Testing Increase, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1996, at Al.
4 See Larry 0. Natt Gantt II, An Affront to Human Dignity:
Electronic Mail Monitoring In the Private Sector Workplace, 8
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 349 (1995).
5 See, Julie A. Flanagan, Restricting Electronic Monitoring in
the Private Workplace, 43 DuKE L.J. 1256, 1258-59 (1994)
(describing the forms of electronic monitoring used, includ-
ing computer-based monitoring, telephone call accounting
and service observation, and video surveillance).
6 See, e.g., Meloff v. New York Life Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 372
at least twenty-one percent searched employees'
computer files, voice mail, and e-mail -or other
networking communications systems.' In addi-
tion, almost one-third of these companies did not
warn their employees of this practice. 2 A 1996
study on workplace privacy by the American Civil
Liberties Union estimates that 20 million employ-
ees have their e-mail, computer files and voice
mail searched by their employers.3 Consequently,
many employees are unaware of either the capa-
bility, or the willingness, of employers to monitor
employees through their computers.4 Meanwhile,
employer incentive to monitor employees
through the use of computers is enhanced by the
ease and capability provided by advanced technol-
ogy.5 The motivation to monitor employees is fur-
ther compounded by the potential liability that
employer's face for the contents of employee e-
mail messages and employee activities on the In-
ternet.6 Such actions are justified by the argu-
ment that the computer system is owned and op-
erated by the company, and that the employee is
on the job performing tasks related to the job.7
The unhappy consequence is a situation wherein
the employee's privacy rights are routinely in-
vaded by the employer, who, at the same time, ar-
(2d Cir. 1995) (allowing employment discrimination and def-
amation claims to proceed, where employer sent notification
of plaintiffs termination to individuals in the company on
the electronic mail system, and where employer sent a com-
pany-wide message entitled "Fraud" which asserted plaintiff
defrauded the company); Boone v. Federal Express Corp., 59
F.3d 84 (8th Cir. 1995) (alleging racial discrimination based
on e-mail messages transmitted between employees regard-
ing plaintiffs employment and retraining); Strauss v.
Microsoft Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding
sufficient evidence to defeat motion for summary judgment
in a sexual discrimination case, in which evidence included e-
mail messages sent by Microsoft employees to plaintiff and
other employees was provided).
7 Interview by Pat Etheridge with Hal Coxson, Manage-




gues that he or she is only exercising legitimate
and protective rights as an employer.8
These positions become darkly adversarial
when the monitoring of personal e-mail accounts
results in the termination of an employee, or
some other disciplinary action. Not surprisingly,
employees are increasingly looking to Congress
for some recognition of and protection from this
invasion of privacy. Others are looking to the
courts to develop a framework which suitably and
fairly addresses these competing interests.
Responding to these interests, in August 1996, a
California based group known as Cyberspace Pro-
fessionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR),9 is-
sued a statement of "Electronic Privacy Princi-
ples"10 containing guidelines for employer
providers, service providers, and other groups
that have access to personal information about
their subscribers or users. The document calls for
united efforts on the part of service providers and
employers to protect the privacy of those using
their services.'I The paper urges employers to
provide and follow clear company policies de-
lineating acceptable uses of e-mail, describing the
procedures which will be used for enforcing the
policy, and outlining penalties to be imposed for
improper use of the system.12 Users are also en-
couraged to become aware of their employer's
policy and the risks of using computer and e-mail
networks.' These proposals, however, have not
been solidified by federal legislation or by court
decisions, and any effect the policies may have in
litigation is still uncertain.
In light of the importance of developing law ap-
propriate in this area, this Comment evaluates
8 Id. Hal Coxson, a management lawyer, lists other justi-
fications for employer monitoring of employees. According
to Coxson, legitimate business reasons for the monitoring in-
clude: (1) monitoring employee performance, which in-
cludes monitoring productivity, quality of work and customer
satisfaction; (2) detecting employee misconduct, specifically,
theft, drugs, gambling, misuse of company property for dis-
closure of confidential material over e-mail; (3) protecting
employees' safety and health; (4) reducing liability for em-
ployee acts. Mr. Coxson notes that employees are capable of
gaining access to sexually explicit material over the World
Wide Web, which can create a hostile work environment, for
which the employer can be held liable. Increased monitor-
ing of employee's use of their computers and software is
therefore justified. Id.
9 The Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility is
an incorporated public-interest alliance of computer scien-
tists and others interested in the impact of computer technol-
ogy on society. Matt Ball, Computer Professionals for Social Re-
sponsibility (last updated Oct. 2, 1996) <http://cpsr.org/dox/
and explains the direction the courts have re-
cently taken. Part I discusses the types of law
which may provide protection of employee e-mail,
and which may aid the courts in developing a
framework of analysis. Part II addresses recent
cases in which courts have allowed employer ac-
cess of the employee's e-mail and rejected claims
of invasion of privacy. Part III examines the ratio-
nales of these cases and suggests that the court de-
cisions provide inadequate protection from un-
warranted invasions of privacy and run counter to
public concern. Part IV proposes that, in order to
balance the important interests of employees' pri-
vacy and employer's rights as providers of the net-
work, guidelines should be established which di-
minish the likelihood that companies will be held
liable for the unauthorized activities of their em-
ployees, thus reducing the incentive to monitor
and control the e-mail of employees. This allevia-
tion of liability, coupled with the development of
responsible and balanced company policies, will
diminish the intrusion into employee e-mail.
I. SOURCES OF PROTECTION FROM
EMPLOYER MONITORING OF EMPLOYEE
E-MAIL
A. The United States and State Constitutions
The Fourth Amendment provides the general
right of privacy in the United States Constitu-
tion.14 It is settled, however, that the Fourth
Amendment protects people from unreasonable
searches and seizures performed by the govern-
ment, and does not necessarily apply to searches
home.html>. CPSR sponsors an annual conference, main-
tains numerous mailing lists on computer-related issues, a
large internet site of information and publishes a quarterly
newsletter. EPIC Online Guide to Privacy Resources (last up-
dated Oct. 2, 1996) <http://www.epic.org/privacy/privacy-
resources-faq.html>.
10 Harry Hocheiser and Andrew Oram, Electronic Privacy
Principles (last modified Sept. 10, 1996) <http://www.cpsr.
org/dox/program/privacy/privacy8.htm>.
11 Id. at 1.
12 Id. at 2.
13 Id. at 1.
14 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides that the "right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ."U.S. CONST
amend. IV. While the amendment does not explicitly protect
or articulate a right of privacy, the Supreme Court has found
it to fall within the ambit of the amendment. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
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performed by private parties.15 Therefore, unless
a person is employed by the government, the
Fourth Amendment does not offer a protection of
privacy in that employee's e-mail.
Many state constitutions also contain either an
explicit right to privacy or have been read by the
courts of the state to protect the right of privacy.
While most rights of privacy, like those in the U.S.
Constitution, protect the individual from govern-
ment intrusion into this right, there appears to be
a trend toward providing a right of privacy which
extends to the workplace for those employed in
the private sector.16 California's protection, for
example, has been interpreted to prohibit in-
fringements into privacy unless the invasion isjus-
tified by a "compelling interest."17 It is not clear,
however, whether the broad protection of privacy
which states have granted will be extended to pri-
vate sector employees regarding their e-mail
messages in the face of competing arguments for
the right of the employer to monitor the em-
ployee use of the service.
B. Federal Statutes
Federal statutes appear more likely to offer pro-
tection for the privacy of e-mail in the workplace.
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 ("ECPA") is the primary statute in this
area.' The ECPA is an amendment to Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act
of 1968,19 and was passed in recognition of the
need to update privacy protection in order to re-
main abreast of quickly changing and developing
technology.20
Generally, the ECPA amended the federal wire-
tap statute by adding the protection of "electronic
communications" wherever the act had previously
protected wire and oral communications, 21 and
prohibits the interception of these communica-
tions.22 The disclosure and dissemination of in-
formation obtained in violation of the statute is
also prohibited.23 Additionally, while the trans-
mission of communications is protected from in-
terception by § 2511 of the Act, a provision was
i5 See, e.g., United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14
(1984) (stating that a search or seizure performed by a pri-
vate individual, "even an unreasonable one," is not pro-
scribed by the Fourth Amendment); see also Paul F. Gerhart,
Employee Privacy Rights in the United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J.
175, 176 (1995) (noting that Constitutional protections of
government employees "do not extend to citizens vis-a-vis
each other," and that therefore, "public sector employees en-
joy greater explicit protection of their privacy rights than pri-
vate sector employees do"); Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch your E-
mail! Employee E-mail Monitoring and Privacy Law in the Age of
the "Electronic Sweatshop", 28J. MARSHALL L. Riv. 139, 146 n.37
(1994) (observing that since "only government employees
may claim a Constitutional privacy right should their e-mail
be accessed; nongovernment employees have no Constitu-
tional guarantee of privacy in the workplace, unless infringed
by a government search or seizure[,]" employees in the pri-
vate sector "actually enjoy less privacy protection than those
working for the government").
16 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I § 22 ("The right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed");
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy"); see also Lee, supra note 15, at
149-50, 173 (outlining state constitutional protections and
the corresponding interpretations of the state courts).
17 See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see, e.g., Porten v. Univ. of
San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976) (finding improper
the disclosure of a student's grades by a private university to
the State Scholarship and Loan Commission); White v. Davis,
120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975) (stating that the amendment to the
constitution requires the government to establish a compel-
ling justification for the invasion of privacy).
18 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710, 3117, 3121-3126 (1994)).
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 does not address the
issue of privacy of e-mail in the workplace.
19 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994).
20 S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1986), re-
printed in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
21 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994) (adding "elec-
tronic" to "wire" and "oral" communications included in defi-
nition of "intercept"); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (1994) (substitut-
ing "wire, oral or electronic" for "wire or oral" in
introductory provisions, and substituting "provider of wire or
electronic communication service" for "communications
common carrier"); 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994) (substituting
"wire, oral, or electronic" for "wire or oral"); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12)-(18) (1994) (adding definitions of "electronic
communication", "electronic communications system", "elec-
tronic communication service", "readily accessible to the gen-
eral public", "electronic storage", "aural transfer"); the Act
defines "electronic communication" as any "transfer of signs,
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, elec-
tromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system . . ." 18
U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994).
22 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994). "Intercept" is defined
as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(4) (1994).
23 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c) - (d) (1994).
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also included to protect the electronic storage of
the communications.2 4
Although the legislative history of the ECPA in-
dicates that e-mail was intended to fall within the
ambit of the Act's protection 25 there are provi-
sions and exceptions which limit that protection
and which, in reality, permit employers in a pri-
vate company to access the e-mail of their employ-
ees without violating the statute. Generally, the
statutory language creates an "ordinary course of
business" exception, an exception under the
stored communications provisions, a limitation
under the commerce clause, and an exception
based on consent.26
First, the ECPA retains language which estab-
lishes an "ordinary course of business" exception.
The definition of "device" specifically excludes
any telephone or component "furnished to the
subscriber or user by a provider of [the] . .. com-
munication service in the ordinary course of its
business and being used by the subscriber or user
in the ordinary course of its business . . . ."27 It is
unclear from this definition whether a modem,
software, or the specific computer system or or-
ganization used by the network manager will be
24 See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994). The statute makes subject
to punishment whoever "intentionally accesses without au-
thorization a facility through which an electronic communi-
cation service is provided; or intentionally exceeds an author-
ization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or
prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communi-
cation while it is in electronic storage in such system . . ." 18
U.S.C. § 2701(a) (1994). "Electronic Storage" is defined in
§ 2510(17) as "any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire
or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof; and any storage of such communica-
tion by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection of such communication." 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(17) (1994).
25 S. RE:P. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 14 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568, reviewed by Lee,
supra note 15, at 151 (observing that although the ECPA does
not specifically mention electronic mail, it is included in the
scope of the general provisions, as is indicated by the prohibi-
tion of interception of electronic communications, which, ac-
cording to the legislative history includes e-mail); see also
Thomas R. Greenberg, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Pyivacy
and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 219, 236
(1994).
26 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(5) (a) (i), 2701 (c) (a), 2501(12),
2511(2)(d) (1994).
27 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (a) (i) (1994). This section defines
device as:
any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a
wire, oral, or electronic communication other than -
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment
or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to
the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic
considered an interception device by the courts.
If these components are excluded from the defi-
nition of device, interception of e-mail would be
permitted by this provision.28 Private telephone
networks are clearly covered by the business use
exception, which allows employers to monitor em-
ployee telephone calls with little risk of liability.
29
Additionally, because the ECPA contains a similar
provision that is broader in scope than the tele-
phone device exception but is not limited to spe-
cific types of equipment, it may be read to include
private company networks.30 This section states
that it is not unlawful for an:
operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or
agent of a provider of wire or electronic communica-
tion service, whose facilities are used in the transmis-
sion of a wire or electronic communication, to inter-
cept, disclose, or use that communication in the
normal course of his employment while engaged in any
activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of
his service or to the protection of the rights or property
of the provider of that service s.
Although "provider" is not defined in the stat-
ute, it could be interpreted to be the owner and
operator of a private network - such as within a
company.32 Further, where the "provider" is seen
communication service in the ordinary course of its busi-
ness and being used by the subscriber or user in the or-
dinary course of its business or furnished by such sub-
scriber or user for connection to the facilities of such
service and used in the ordinary course of its business.
Id.
28 See Lee, supra note 15, at 154.
29 See, e.g., Sanders v. Robert Bosch Corp., 38 F.3d 736
(4th Cir. 1994) (applying provisions of the ECPA where a
company recorded telephone conversations of an employee);
Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying provi-
sions of the ECPA where telephone conversations were inter-
cepted and recorded); Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., Inc.,
630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980) (interpreting the "extension tel-
ephone exception" of the ECPA); see Greenberg, supra note
25, at 235-36.
30 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2) (a) (i) (1994). This section limits
the access of a provider of wire transmission service to the
public in that such provider is not permitted to use random
monitoring except for service or mechanical control checks.
Id. The same limitation is not placed on the provider of the
electronic communication because it was believed that total
access is necessary to ensure proper function of the service.
Greenberg, supra note 25, at 237 n.97.
3 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1994).
32 See Greenberg, supra note 25, at 236 n.91 (noting that
the language of the section was changed from "any commu-
nication common carrier" to "a provider of wire or electronic
communication service" and suggesting that the section envi-
sions the right to intercept the communications if the em-
ployee of a business with a private communications system
intercepts another employee's message in the normal course
of the employee's employment and it occurs as a result of
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as a large public network, the company could be a
"subscriber" or an "agent" of the "provider,"33 and
thus fall under the exception.
Should the reading of service provider as owner
of a private network, or as agent to the provider,
prevail, the door is opened to monitoring by the
employer through a second exception under the
stored communication provisions. According to
the provision, it is lawful to access stored commu-
nications if it is done pursuant to authorization
"by the person or entity providing a wire or elec-
tronic communications service."3 4 Therefore, if a
company that supplies e-mail service to its employ-
ees is seen as a service provider, simple authoriza-
tion from the company is required to access the
stored messages received and sent by its employ-
ees. The employer or service provider would,
however, be required to prove the monitoring was
carried out in the ordinary course of business and
necessary to the performance of the service or to
protect rights or property. Courts may find the
mere need to prevent abuse of the system and
computer crime reason enough to allow system
monitoring.35 Thus, the ECPA would permit the
employer to monitor its employee's e-mail.
Still other aspects of the Act are seen as provid-
ing exceptions to the general prohibition of mon-
itoring. For example, since the jurisdiction of
Congress is limited to interstate commerce, the
definition of "electronic communications" under
the ECPA is limited to communications and sys-
tems which "affect interstate or foreign com-
merce."3 6 Consequently, a small intracompany
system which does not cross state lines may not be
covered by the ECPA.3 7 Additionally, under the
necessary activity or as a result of protecting the provider's
rights or property); see also Lee, supra note 15, at 155 (sug-
gesting that "provider" will likely include public e-mail net-
works, such as Prodigy and CompuServe, and could include
companies with their own e-mail systems on their own inter-
state area). It should further be noted that the statute specif-
ically addresses "a person or entity providing an electronic
communication service to the public," prohibiting this pro-
vider from intentionally divulging the contents of any com-
munication while in transmission on the service. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(3) (a) (1994). This may suggest a distinction in the
definition of "providers," and, thus, support the reading of
"provider" as a private company.
33 See Lee, supra note 15, at 155.
34 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (1994).
35 Lee, supra note 15, at 156.
36 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(1) (1994) (defining "wire communication" and apply-
ing to "person engaged in providing or operating such facili-
ECPA interception of communications is permit-
ted where one of the parties to a communication
has given prior consent.38 Therefore, whether or
not personal employee communications are pro-
tected may depend on the notion of implied con-
sent. To determine the existence of consent, the
court may consider whether the company has a
policy on e-mail in the workplace, whether the
employee is aware of the policy and whether the
employee has agreed to abide by that policy. In
this respect, the presence of a policy could work
against the employee's claim of privacy if the pol-
icy addressed the possibility of monitoring. The
company would not, however, be permitted to go
beyond the parameters of the policy.3 9
C. State Statutes
Many states also have statutes which limit the in-
terception of electronic communications. 40
Although states are free to enact measures which
restrict employer monitoring of employees fur-
ther than the federal statute, many of the states
which have statutes simply incorporate the ECPA
exceptions pertaining to consent and business
use.4 1 Study of the particular state statutory
framework is necessary to determine the scope of
protection provided by the statute because, for ex-
ample, while the "business use" exemption may
apply only to "common carriers," a "prior con-
sent" provision in the statute may still enable the
employer to access the employee's e-mail
messages without violating the statute. 4 2 Further-
more, while most states have wiretapping statutes
which may offer protection from employer wire-
ties for the transmission of interstate or foreign communica-
tions or communications affecting interstate or foreign
commerce .... ).
37 Lee, supra note 15, at 152-53.
38 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994).
39 See Lee, supra note 15, at 153.
40 See Greenberg, supra note 25, at 222-24 n.16 (listing
state statutes which provide a private right of action for ille-
gal wiretapping).
41 See Lee, supra note 15, at 175 (outlining state statutes
with prior consent and business use wiretap exemptions - Ta-
ble 2).
42 See Lee, supra note 15, at 158-59 (discussing state stat-
ute protection and noting that although some states require
the consent of "all parties" this requirement may not neces-
sarily provide greater protection if the message in question is
an intracompany message, for a company policy on the issue,




tapping and interception of communications, 43
other states are more permissive and specifically
allow the monitoring.44
Efforts at the state level to restrict employer
monitoring of employee e-mail have been largely
unsuccessful.4 5  Despite the failure to restrict
monitoring, some state legislatures are making ef-
forts to require employers to inform employees of
potential monitoring of employee e-mail. For ex-
ample, in 1996 the Colorado legislature proposed
a bill that would require the employer to develop
a policy regarding the privacy of electronic mail
and to inform employees of the policy.4 6
D. New Legislation
Attempts at the federal level to restrict em-
ployer monitoring of employee e-mail have met
similar difficulties. The Telecommunications Act
of 1996 did not address the issue of employer
monitoring or accessing the e-mail messages of
employees. The Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act does, however, represent an effort on
the part of the federal government to protect em-
ployees from intrusions in the workplace by the
employer. The proposed law would limit the em-
ployer's ability to monitor employees by requiring
an explanation to new employees as to how they
will be monitored, and how the information gath-
ered would be used.4 7 Furthermore, it would re-
quire notification by the employer before the
monitoring occurs and it would place a cap on
the total time the employer would be permitted to
monitor the employee.48 Moreover, the bill pro-
vides an important caveat; the employer may not
act in regard to the employee based on informa-
43 See Greenberg, supra note 25, at 222-24 n.16.
44 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-702(2)(a) (1994) (per-
mitting "an employer on his, her, or its business premises ...
to intercept, disclose, or use" an electronic communication
while "in the normal course of his, her, or its employment
. . . ."), reviewed by Lee, supra note 15, at 159 (citing NEB. REV.
STAT. § 86-702(2) (a) (1994)).
45 See, e.g., Lee, supra at note 15, at 160 (noting recent
unsuccessful efforts in Texas and California and attributing
the failure of the bills to corporate lobbyists and discussing
various proposals at the state level many of which would limit
employer surveillance of employees, but which would not
necessarily protect employee e-mail).
46 H.B. 1199, 60th Leg., 2d Sess. (Colo. 1996).
47 S. 984, 103d Cong. §§ 4(B), 4(B)(3) (1993).
48 Id. at §§ 5(B), 5(B)(3).
49 Id. at § 8(a).
50 As an indication of the polarity of positions taken on
tion illegally obtained.49
Although the bill has gained support, it has also
been the subject of much debate.50 Opponents
point to vague and undefined terms, claiming the
bill will be difficult to administer and unnecessa-
rily burdensome.5 1 Others argue that the limits
would hinder the growth of the electronic messag-
ing business.5 2 Thus, although the bill demon-
strates the recognition of the problem, it also rep-
resents the inherent obstacles in creating a
solution.
E. The Common Law
Still another source of protection lies in a com-
mon law suit for invasion of privacy. Under the
tort of invasion of privacy,53 "intrusion into seclu-
sion or private affairs" applies most aptly in the
context of e-mail in the workplace. This tort is
committed by "lo]ne who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or se-
clusion of another or his private affairs or con-
cerns, . . . if the intrusion would be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person."5 4  Courts will
consider several factors to ascertain whether a
person's privacy has been infringed to merit re-
covery. Courts generally will evaluate: (1)
whether there was an intentional intrusion; (2)
the location and private nature of the activity in-
volved; (3) whether the intrusion was "highly of-
fensive to the reasonable person;" and (4)
whether the infringer had a legitimate purpose
warranting the intrusion.55 Relatively few cases
have dealt with this tort in the context of e-mail
and invasion of privacy by an employer. Conse-
quently, analysis of these issues has focused largely
the issue, and an indication that it is far from settled, is the
introduction of the Telephone Privacy Act of 1993 which
would make it lawful to intercept electronic communication
where "such person is an employer or its agent engaged in
lawful electronic monitoring of its employees' communica-
tions made in the course of the employees' duties." Tele-
phone Privacy Act of 1993, S. 311, 103d Cong. § 2.
51 Lee, supra note 15, at 168-69.
52 Id. at 169.
53 Invasion of privacy is comprised of four separate torts:
(1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;
(2) appropriation of the other's name or likeness; (3) unrea-
sonable publicity given to the other's private life; or (4) pub-
licity that unreasonably places the other in a false light
before the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652A(2) (1977).
54 Id. at 652B.
55 Lee, supra note 15, at 162-63.
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on how courts would approach a claim under this
tort, and the various analogies which could be
made to current and established case law.5 6 The
success of this claim as applied to e-mail in the
context of the workplace will be fact-specific.
Therefore, in order to determine such issues as
the employee's expectation of privacy in the elec-
tronic message system, which is a consideration
necessary for the determination of whether the in-
trusion is "highly offensive," the court will have to
consider such factors as whether the company
had a policy in place regarding the use of the e-
mail system. If the company has a policy, and the
employee is informed of potential monitoring,
the expectation of privacy may be reduced. The
result, then, is that even under the common law
tort of invasion of privacy, the employee's right to
the privacy of her or his e-mail is not protected.
II. CASE LAW AS FURTHER POLARIZATION
OF THE POSITIONS
Electronic mail has spurred the development of
law around problems and issues which have never
before been addressed. For example, hard copies
of electronic mail messages have been introduced
into evidence in courts as proof of harassment.5 7
Only recently, however, courts have begun to ad-
dress the problem on its face: are e-mail messages
sent by an employee to another person, fellow
employee or not, entitled to protection from inva-
sion by the employer?
The cases are beginning to be heard, testing
the protection offered by the Fourth Amendment,
the ECPA, and common law suit of invasion of pri-
vacy. The results, however, only aggravate the
problem.
A. Smyth v. Pillsbury Company
The common law claim of invasion of privacy
56 See generally, Lee, supra note 15, at 162-64 (explaining
and outlining the parameters and requirements of the tort
based on cases involving eavesdropping on the telephone,
photographing of employees, searching employees desks and
lockers, opening of personal mail, and recording conversa-
tions).
57 See e.g., Knox v. Ind., 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996).
58 Smith v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 92, 97 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
59 Id. at 98.
60 Id. at 101.
61 Id. at 98.
was addressed in Smyth v. Pillsbury Company.58 In
Smyth, a regional operations manager for The
Pillsbury Company ("Pillsbury"), an at-will em-
ployee, brought suit against his employer for
wrongful discharge.59 The District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the ac-
tion, finding that Pillsbury did not tortiously in-
vade Smyth's privacy when it intercepted his e-
mail, and, therefore, that it did not violate public
policy when it terminated his employment based
on the contents of the messages.60
Smyth was discharged in 1995 for communicat-
ing what the defendant considered to be "inap-
propriate and unprofessional comments" over the
defendant's internal e-mail system.61  Smyth's
messages were part of a series of messages ex-
changed between Smyth and his supervisor. Ini-
tially, Smyth was responding to messages received
on his computer at home from his supervisor in
the company.62 The termination was directly con-
trary to the company's policy on e-mail, which as-
sured the employees of Pillsbury that "all e-mail
communications would remain confidential and
privileged"63 and that "e-mail communications
could not be intercepted and used by [Pillsbury]
against its employees as grounds for termination
or reprimand."6 4
Smyth attempted to establish his claim of
wrongful discharge on the basis of invasion of pri-
vacy. 65 He argued that "public policy precludes
an employer from terminating an employee in vi-
olation of the employee's right to privacy as em-
bodied in Pennsylvania common law".66 In partic-
ular, Smyth relied on the Pennsylvania Court of
Appeals opinion in Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc.67
In Borse, the Court of Appeals considered a claim
for wrongful discharge where the plaintiff was
fired after refusing to submit to urinalysis screen-
ing and personal property searches at her work-
62 Id. at 98. The opinion does not reproduce the con-
tents of the messages received by Smyth, but notes Defend-
ant's allegation that Smyth's e-mails "concerned sales man-
agement and contained threats to 'kill the backstabbing
bastards' and referred to the planned Holiday party as the
'Jim Jones Koolaid affair."' Id.
63 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 100.
66 Id.




place.68 Although the court in Borse declined to
find the company's procedure in violation of pub-
lic.policy, it opened the door to a wrongful dis-
charge claim based on invasion of privacy by not-
ing "other evidence of a public policy" may give
rise to such a claim. 69
The Court of Appeals in Borse outlined the ap-
proach to a case in which the action is based on
the tort of "intrusion upon seclusion."70 First, the
Court of Appeals noted that where an action for
wrongful discharge asserts a relationship between
the discharge and an invasion of the employee's
privacy, the court would examine the facts and
circumstances to determine whether "an alleged
invasion of privacy is substantial and highly offen-
sive to a reasonable person."7 1 Second, as the Dis-
trict Court explained, the Borse court anticipated
the use of a balancing test to weigh "the em-
ployee's privacy interest against the employer's in-
terest in maintaining a drug free workplace."7 2
The court in Smyth addressed his claim by ex-
plaining that Pennsylvania law does not recognize
a cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an
at-will employee, but that exceptions to the gen-
eral rule have been made where a mandate of
public policy has been violated.73 The court then
listed the recognized exceptions, 74 and stated that
the public policy on which the exception is based
must be clearly defined.7 5 Further, the court out-
lined the sources of the public policy on which an
exception could be based, and pointed to Borse
which states that the bases can be found in "legis-
lation, administrative rules, regulation, or deci-
sion; and judicial decisions."76
Without evaluating the sources of Smyth's pub-
lic policy argument, however, the court evaluated
68 Id. at 613. The urinalysis and personal property
searches were performed pursuant to the employer's drug
and alcohol policy. Id.
69 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting
Borse, 963 F.2d at 620).
70 Borse, 963 F.2d at 621.
71 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100 (quoting Borse, 963 F.2d at
622).
72 Id. (quoting Borse, 963 F.2d at 625).
73 Id. at 99.
74 Id. The court highlights the three recognized excep-
tions: (1) an employee may not be fired for serving on jury
duty; (2) an employee may not be denied employment based
on the existence of a prior conviction; and (3) an employee
may not be fired for reporting violations of federal regula-
tions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Id.
75 Id.
76 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 99 (quoting Borse, 963 F.2d at
619 n.6).
the claim based on the "intrusion of seclusion"
framework outlined in the Restatement and
adopted by the Court of Appeals in Borse.77 Ac-
cording to the Borse analysis, a finding that the dis-
charge was "related to" an invasion of privacy
which is substantial and highly offensive would
merit the conclusion that the discharge violated
public policy.78 First, the court concluded that
there is no "reasonable expectation of privacy., in
e-mail communications voluntarily made by an
employee to his supervisor over the company e-
mail system notwithstanding any assurances that
such communications would not be intercepted
by management."79 Second, the court concluded
that the reasonable expectation of privacy was lost
"once plaintiff communicated the alleged unpro-
fessional comments to a second person (his super-
visor) over an e-mail system which was apparently
utilized by the entire company."80 This conclu-
sion by the court implies that the breadth of use
of the system is equivalent to access to the com-
munications. Thus, since the whole company uses
the system, the whole company has access to the
communications, and therefore a person using
the system has no expectation of privacy. The
court's implication ignores the necessity of a com-
pany to use a single network, and further disre-
gards the fact that the messages are not necessar-
ily revealed to the entire system, or even the
system administrator. E-mail is not a broadcast to
everyone in the company or on the same system.
Without a finding of a reasonable expectation of
privacy, however, there can be no invasion of pri-
vacy.
In determining that Smyth did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the messages,
77 Id. The court relies on the determination of whether
the alleged invasion of privacy was substantial and highly of-
fensive to indicate whether a public policy exception is war-
ranted. Had the court utilized its own suggested sources of
the public policy in its analysis, however, it could have ac-
knowledged the policy. For examplpe, in addition to the
ECPA, which had as one of its intended targets privacy of
electronic communications, and e-mail in particular, Penn-
sylvania passed a statute in 1993 which requires the consent
of all parties to the communication before disclosure of the
messages can be lawfully made. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5704(4)
(1996).
78 Borse, 963 F.2d at 622.
79 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101. Note, however, that not
only were the employees assured the communications would
remain confidential, but also that the company could not in-
tercept the messages. Id. at 98.
80 Id. at 101.
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the court placed significant weight on its assertion
that the employer did not require the plaintiff to
disclose any personal information about him-
self,8 ' and distinguished these facts from the situa-
tion in Borse, where the employees were subject to
urinalysis screening and personal property
searches. 2 The court further explained that the
"plaintiff voluntarily communicated the alleged
unprofessional comments over the company e-
mail system."83 The distinction drawn by the
court, however, fails to take account of the em-
ployer's conduct in the case. In both Borse and
Smyth the employer is the actor, in some way ac-
cessing information about the employee. In a
search of personal property, the employer peruses
the personal property in search of drugs, or some
evidence of misconduct. Incidental to the search
would be the disclosure of personal information.
The same is true of communications made using
an electronic mail system. For whatever reason,
perhaps to ascertain the current company morale,
the employer browses the e-mail system. Such
browsing of the communications contained on
the system is certain to reveal personal informa-
tion about the employee, particularly when the
employee has no idea that the messages are inter-
cepted - indeed believes them to be private and
confidential. In both cases discovery of the infor-
mation is predicated upon the employer's action.
In Borse the employer's action required the partic-
ipation of the employee and .was pursuant to a
policy; in Smyth the action was surreptitious and
directly contrary to the policy. In both cases,
then, the employee's privacy is invaded, but in
Smyth the policy created an expectation of confi-
dentiality which was not honored by the em-
ployer.




84 Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 101.
87 Bohach v. Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232 (Nev. 1996).
88 Id. at 1233. The court's discussion of the message sys-
tem indicates that it is a software program which allows the
transmission of brief alphanumeric messages to visual display
pagers. Id. Formally known as "Alphapage Media Notifica-
tion System," the software allows messages to be sent by tele-
phone, by "stand-alone" keyboard, or by the LAN computer
system. The third method is alphanumeric and is the type of
message involved in this case. The alphanumeric method
does not involve the human voice, and, sent from a computer
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the e-mail messages, Pillsbury's interception of
his communications is not a substantial and
highly offensive invasion of his privacy. 4 To sup-
port this finding, the court again points to its con-
clusion that the company did not require the
plaintiff to disclose any information about himself
"or invad [e] the employee's person or personal
effects." 5 Almost as an afterthought, the court
sought to balance the interests, finding that the
company's interest in preventing "inappropriate
and unprofessional comments, or even illegal ac-
tivity over its e-mail system" outweighs the privacy
interest the employee may have in the comments
or activity.8 6
In ruling for Pillsbury in this case, however, the
court simply ignored the company's conduct. In
doing so, the court requires no responsibility on
the part of the employer, and, therefore, forces
the employee to enter a system at his or her own
risk, unable to rely on the employer's policy. The
decision undermines efforts to establish a satisfac-
tory relationship between employer and employee
because the employer is not required to abide by
rules of common decency, and it weakens possible
protection of employee privacy rights in the work-
place.
B. Bohach v. City of Reno
In Bohach v. City of Reno,8 7 the District Court for
the District of Nevada addressed the claims of two
police officers that the Reno Police Department
violated the federal wiretapping statute and their
constitutional right to privacy when the Depart-
ment stored and retrieved messages they had sent
over the Department's "Alphapage" message sys-
tem.88 The issues were presented to the court
terminal, is essentially "e-mail." Id. at 1234. The court ex-
plains the process of sending the message via the Alphapage
system as follows. After logging onto any computer in the
Reno Department, the user selects Alphapage from a menu,
then selects the name of the person with whom the user
would like to communicate. Then, the user types the
message on the computer, and "sends" the message. The
computer screen displays that the message is being processed
as it sends the message to the "Inforad Message Directory,"
and stored in a server file. The computer then dials and via
modem, sends the message to a commercial paging com-
pany, then disconnects, at which point the computer indi-
cates that the page has been sent, and the commercial pag-
ing company completes the message transmission by sending
the message to the recipient pager by radio broadcast. Id.
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when the officers Bohach and Catalano sought to
prevent an internal affairs investigation based on
the contents of the messages, and to bar disclo-
sure of the messages.89 The court found the of-
ficers did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the messages, and that obtaining the
messages from the Alphapage system did not vio-
late the prohibitions in the ECPA.90
The court addressed the officers' Fourth
Amendment claim of invasion of a right of privacy
by determining whether the officers had an objec-
tively reasonable expectation of privacy in the
messages. 9' Several factors led the tourt to hold
that they did not. First, because the system auto-
matically stored communications, "not because
anyone is 'tapping' the system, but simply because
that's how the system works,"92 the officers' expec-
tation of privacy in the messages was reduced.9 3
Second, the objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy was reduced because the Chief of Police
had issued an order when the system was installed
notifying the system's users that the messages
would be "logged onto the network,"9 4 and that
certain types of messages were banned from the
system.9 5 Further, access to the system was not
protected or limited by a special password or
clearance. 6 Anyone with general access to the
system could "roam at will through Alphapage."17
Third, the court pointed to the ordinary course of
police station business to record telephone calls
made to and from the station.98 The purpose of
the Alphapage system was to provide communica-
tion between police personnel and between po-
lice and the press, and not necessarily for per-
sonal messages. 9 Thus, not only do the
limitations and purpose of the system demon-
strate a reduced expectation of privacy, even tele-
phone calls from a police station would not enjoy
a reasonable expectation of privacy given the ordi-
89 Id. at 1233.
90 Id. at 1236-37.
9' Id. at 1234.
92 Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1234.
93 Id. at 1235.
94 Id. The court acknowledges that notifying the users of
the system that the messages were to be "logged on the sys-
tem" is not the equivalent of saying that the messages would
be "recorded and retained," but states that the notification
does indicate a diminished expectation of privacy. Id. The
officers had compared the level of expectation of privacy to
that of a telephone line, and the court rejected this compari-
son, specifically finding a lower expectation of privacy in the
messages than in a telephone conversation. Id.
95 Messages in violation of the Department's anti-dis-
nary practice of recording.100
The court then evaluated the assertion that the
retrieval of the messages from the system consti-
tuted a violation of the federal wiretapping stat-
ute, the ECPA. At the outset, the court noted the
inclusion of "electronic communications" in the
statute,101 and explained the statutory distinction
between the "interception" of an electronic com-
munication at the time of transmission and "the
retrieval of such a communication after it has
been put into "electronic storage."10 2 Next, the
court determined whether an "interception" oc-
curred, and concluded that it had not.10 3 The
court asked "how any 'interception,' as the word is
usually understood, could be thought to have oc-
curred here . . . [since] no computer or phone
lines have been tapped, no conversations picked
up by hidden microphones, no duplicate pager
'cloned' to tap into messages intended for an-
other recipient."10 4 By posing the question the
court belied its understanding of the statute.
Under the statutory definition, "interception," or
the "acquisition of the contents of any . . . elec-
tronic . .. communication through the use of any
electronic, mechanical or other device," 0 5 could
occur without the installation of some other de-
vice. 106 Therefore, although it stated the statutory
definition of an interception, the court resorted
to the "usual" or common understanding of the
term to determine whether an interception had
taken place. The court suggested further that "no
one would object" if the computer were merely a
"conduit" or a stop along the way to the recipient,
if the message were not recorded or stored, since
the computer would not have acquired informa-
tion on the contents or purport of the message.
0 7
In addition, the court suggested that even if the
person did object to the computer as a conduit, it
would find implied consent to outside knowledge
crimination policy, and those containing comments on De-
partment policy, were banned from the system. Id. at 1234.
96 Id.




101 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994)).
102 Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1235-36.
103 Id. at 1236.
104 Id.
105 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1994)).
106 Id.
107 Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236.
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of the messages simply because the computer was
used to send messages.10
This narrow reading of "interception" fails to
recognize the purpose of the statute and fails to
account for the capabilities of the technology. By
relying on a common understanding of the term
"intercept," the court defeats the purpose of en-
acting legislation which adapts to advancing tech-
nology. An intercepting device could be read to
be another computer on the system, and it is not
necessarily required to be a covert addition to the
system. Furthermore, a person reading the
message as it passes through the computer con-
duit, a system administrator, for example, would
have "intercepted" the message - for the person
has acquired information about the contents of
the message. The interception may be inadver-
tent, but information is acquired nonetheless.
The court continued, however, and found the
officers to be objecting not to the fact that the
messages passed through the computer, but the
messages were stored and subsequently re-
trieved. 09 This, the court held, cannot amount to
interception because once a.message is stored it is
no longer a communication, and only "communi-
cations" can be intercepted.110 Once the court
identified the messages as being located in "elec-
tronic storage," it needed only to establish the
Reno Police Department as the "provider" of the
"electronic communications service."" As evi-
dence that the department was the system "pro-
vider," the court noted that the software, the
pagers and the computer terminals, all necessary
to send and to receive messages, are provided by
the police department.'1 2 Thus, as a "provider"
under § 2701(c) (1), the department can "do as
they wish when it comes to accessing communica-
tions in electronic storage."113 The court held,
therefore, that the injunction against the police
department was properly denied and that the in-





112 Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1237.
115 See Interview by Pat Etheridge with Hal Coxson, Man-
agement Lawyer and Lewis Maltby, ACLU, in New York, N.Y.
(Sept. 1, 1996).
III. THE EFFECT OF THESE DECISIONS ON
EMPLOYEE PRIVACY IN THE
WORKPLACE
These cases demonstrate the unfortunate
widening of the gap between employees' right to
the privacy of e-mail messages and employer's
concern with and right to monitor employees. As
the gap widens, however, the employer may not
achieve the benefit it seeks. The aforementioned
cases demonstrate that an employer is currently
able to place liability on the employee for the con-
tents of employee e-mail messages - by discharg-
ing the employee for example - and to do so with-
out liability for infringing the employee's privacy.
Rather than preventing and reducing its liability,
however, by implementing monitoring practices,
by asserting more detailed control over employee
use of the e-mail, and by failing to abide by its own
policies, the employer is making itself susceptible
to greater liability for the evils committed using e-
mail.
One of the justifications for employer monitor-
ing of employee e-mail is to prevent its use for
personal reasons, including acts for which the em-
ployer may be liable.' 5 Although the extent of
employer liability for employee misconduct com-
mitted using e-mail and computer software is not
settled, the potential is real and only increased
with computer technology. In the context of def-
amation and slander,' 16 for example, the nature
and perception of e-mail contribute to the likeli-
hood that those torts will be committed.' 1 7 One
analysis of employer liability in the context of
computer technology notes that torts are facili-
tated with electronic communications because the
messages tend to be more casual and because of
the "relatively anonymous nature" of the methods
of electronic communication which may "em-
bolden" employees to communicate in such a way
they would not otherwise communicate.118 Addi-
116 A claim of defamation is established when: (1) the
plaintiff proves the defendant made a false statement of fact;
(2) published the statement to a third party; and (3) the
statement injured the plaintiffs reputation. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORT § 558 (1977).
117 Donald H. Seifman & Craig W. Trepanier, E-mail and





tionally, the communications are subject to misin-
terpretation by the recipient,119 are more easily
"published,"o2 0 and are frequently stored after the
parties have completed the transmission.12 1
Therefore, an employee may defame another on
the e-mail system, and both the precise language
and the fact of "publication" to a third party -
components of the tort - are preserved for the
lawsuit. 122 When defamatory statements are made
by an employee within the scope of the employ-
ment, the employer may be liable.12 3 Not only
could the employer be held liable for the defama-
tion committed by the employee, but also defama-
tion committed by the employer would be easier
to prove.12 4
Employer liability may be increased by the use
of electronic communication in other areas as
well. Under the tort of "product disparage-
ment" 2 5 or trade libel, employers could be held
responsible for the message sent by an employee
regarding a customer or competitor and his or
her goods or business.' 26 Employers may also be
liable for the conduct of employees who post
copyrighted material on the Internet using the
company's computers, or where an employee
downloads material and distributes it in the work-
place.' 2 7 Liability is more likely to attach where
the employer is aware that the posting or distribu-
tion is occurring. 28  Again, developing a com-
pany policy regarding posting information on the
119 The authors note that whereas verbal communica-
tions allow the speaker to "feel out" the audience and to use
body language, tone, voice inflection to minimize the impact
of the statements, these devices of personal communication
are not transferable using electronic mail. Id. Coupled with
the tendency not to draft e-mail messages with precision, the
inability to communicate voice inflection, for example, the
potential for misinterpretation is great. Id.
120 The capability of storing, printing, retransmitting the
message to a third party or mistakenly transmitting the
message to an unintended recipient are features of e-mail
which also heighten the potential for a lawsuit for one of
these torts. Id. at 19 -20.
121 Seifman & Trepanier, supra note 117, at 20.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., Hoke v. Paul, 653 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Haw.
1982) (stating an employer is liable for defamatory acts of
employee if it is done in the course of employment).
124 See, e.g., Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1186,
1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that e-mail messages written
by a claimant's superior allegedly establishing sexual discrim-
ination are admissible in a Title VII case).
125 "Product Disparagement" or "Disparagement of
Quality" is defined as "a false statement harmful to the inter-
ests of another." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A
(1977).
126 Seifman & Trepanier, supra note 117, at 22-23.
Internet has been encouraged as a way of limiting
the instances of copyright infringement and pro-
viding a potential defense for the employer.'29
Sexual harassment is another area where liabil-
ity could be increased as a result of e-mail
messages. 30 The ability of employees to send
messages anonymously, or to attribute the
message to another employee, to retrieve sexually
explicit materials from the Internet, and to play
"pranks" on fellow employees heightens the possi-
bility that a "hostile work environment" could be
created.' 3 ' Importantly, the storage of e-mail
messages may assist the plaintiff in establishing
the existence of the hostile work environment.132
The widespread use of e-mail and the ease with
which information can be transmitted poses an
additional risk to employers seeking to protect
trade secrets.133 One analysis of the problem
notes that since most statutes which protect trade
secrets require a showing that the employer made
reasonable efforts to keep the information confi-
dential, 34 employers should refrain from trans-
mitting sensitive information using e-mail, and
should clarify for employees specifically the infor-
mation appropriate for communication on the e-
mail system.133
In recognition of these risks, employers are ad-
vised to instruct and to train employees on the
proper use of e-mail.' 3 6 Additionally, analysts en-
courage employers to monitor employee e-mail
127 Id. at 22.
128 Id.
129 See Seifman & Trepanier, supra note 117, at 23; see
also, Abdon M. Pallasch, Company Policies to Monitor E-mail
Licking Edge ofElectronic Envelope, CHICAGO LAWYER, Aug. 1995,
at 4.
130 Seifman & Trepanier, supra note 117, at 19-20.
131 Employers can be held liable for sexual harrassment
resulting from a "hostile work environment" when "an em-
ployee is subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a 'sexual
nature' and "such conduct has the purpose or effect of un-
reasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work envi-
ronment." Seifman & Trepanier, supra note 117, at 22 (cit-
ing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1996)).
132 Seifman & Trepanier, supra note 117, at 20.
133 Seifman & Trepanier, supra note 117, at 22.
134 A "trade secret" is defined in the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act as "information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or pro-
cess, that . . . is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." Seifman &
Trepanier, supra note 117, at 22 (citing UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
Acr § 1 (4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 433 (Supp. 1996)).
135 Seifman & Trepanier, supra note 117, at 23.
136 Id. at 19.
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and strictly to enforce the policies adopted by the
companies regarding e-mail.1 37 Along with rou-
tine monitoring and organizing of the informa-
tion contained on the employer's computer sys-
tem, analysts also suggest incorporating a policy
which includes the regular deletion of messages
and information contained on the company sys-
tem in order to rid the system of damaging evi-
dence, while avoiding the "negative inference"
created by missing data.138 Thus, the develop-
ment of company policies tends toward greater
control of employee e-mail.
It is a fundamental principle of agency law that
when extensive control is exercised by the princi-
pal over the agent, it is more likely that the princi-
pal will be responsible for the conduct and mis-
conduct of the agent.'3 9 Indeed, developing
company policies on e-mail and encouraging em-
ployees to exercise restraint in their use of e-mail
may be a means of reducing liability by educating
employees and thereby reducing the incidents of
the torts or illegal behavior. This control, how-
ever, may also increase the liability of the em-
ployer. Plaintiffs could claim negligent supervi-
sion,14 0 or that a "reasonable" employer would
have conducted monitoring to find inappropriate
use of the system.141 In addition, a plaintiff could
seek to establish a presumption of knowledge on
the part of the employer using the existence of
the monitoring practice or policy.
By failing to recognize an employee expecta-
tion of privacy, the courts in Smyth and Bohach
have contributed to the potential extension of lia-
bility. The result of these cases is not only that the
employee cannot expect privacy in an e-mail
message system, and cannot rely on the company
policy, but also that the employer will be forced
into monitoring every e-mail to prevent miscon-
duct, misuse and abuse of the system. This moni-
toring reduces what little privacy the employee is
currently able to claim. Despite compelling argu-
ments in justification of employee monitoring,
when done surreptitiously and in contravention
137 Id. at 23.
138 David C. Jacobson, Peril of the E-mail Trial, NAT'L L.J.
at 1, 22 (Jan. 16, 1995).
139 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 140 (1958).
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 317 (1965).
141 Seifman & Trepanier, supra note 117, at 20.
142 Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 99 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (citations omitted).
143 Id. (quoting Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d
of a stated policy, it will reduce the use of the ad-
vancing technology, thus slowing advancement,
and, more importantly, restricting the expression
and transmission of ideas and speech.
As cases similar to Smyth and Bohach are
presented to courts across the country, courts
should begin to establish a framework of analysis
for the issue. This approach should begin with a
recognition of a public policy exception to a
wrongful discharge claim where the employee is
an at will employee. Although the court declined
to break ground regarding a public policy excep-
tion in Smyth the opinion provides the starting
point. The court states that sources for the public
policy "can be found in 'legislation, administrative
rules, regulation, or decision; and judicial deci-
sions . . . . Absent legislation, the judiciary must
define the cause of action in case by case determi-
nations." 14 2 The court also cites a case from the
Third Circuit which supports the assertion that
"'a clear mandate of public policy' [is] embodied
in a constitutionally or legislatively established
prohibition, requirement, or privilege." 4 3 The
treatment given to the public policy claim, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the existence of the
ECPA and its protection of electronic communi-
cations, including e-mail, as an indication of pub-
lic policy.' 4 4 The court also overlooks legislation
that has been proposed in Congress and state leg-
islatures which has the specific purpose of pro-
tecting e-mail.14 5 The language in Borse also sug-
gests the possibility of such an exception.14 6
Therefore, had the court endeavored to find justi-
fication for acknowledging the public policy ex-
ception recognizing that termination of employ-
ment should not be based on information gained
by an invasion of privacy, it could have the basis
for the exception in the very sources it cited.
Although it may be harder tojustify recognition
of a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail
messages transmitted using a computer owned by
the company, via a system operated by the com-
pany, especially given the company's technical
1338, 1344 (3d Cir. 1990)).
144 Id. at 101; see, e.g., S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568
(indicating a general Congressional intent to protect e-
mail.).
145 See, e.g., The Privacy for Consumers and Workders
Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993).




ability to retrieve messages and overwrite pass-
words, the unfairness of a situation which allows
the employer to monitor employee communica-
tions without restraint is clear. Courts should re-
quire adherence by the employer to a company
policy by allowing evidence of the existence and
implementation of a clear policy of which the em-
ployees have notice. Where the company devel-
ops policy, notifies employees of its intentions and
limits its practice of monitoring capabilities to the
guidelines announced in the policy, the com-
pany's liability should be limited, and the em-
ployee should be entitled to the measure of pri-
vacy provided by the policy.
Allowing employers to limit liability for wrongs
committed against third parties using e-mail pro-
vided by the employer will encourage employers
to develop company policies which employ only
limited monitoring; for example, to verify asser-
tions of harassment. It will also encourage em-
ployers to adhere more closely to the policies they
implement. This will provide the measure of pri-
vacy sought by employees, and at the same time
will encourage the education of employees on the
legality, capability and limits of employer's moni-
toring of e-mail messages. This education, in
turn, will lead to more responsible and informed
use of e-mail by the employees. Instead of being
trapped by their own ignorance, they will feel se-
cure in the boundaries and appropriate uses.
Both employees and employers will receive
favorable results from the open approach to the
technology of electronic communications which
court imposed requirements of a policy and dis-
closure will afford.
The benefits to employers of disclosure of the
employer's capabilities were seen in Bohach. The
court pointed specifically to explanatory state-
ments given by the Chief of Police when the sys-
147 Bohach v. Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (D. Nev.
1996).
148 Id.
tem was installed. 147 The employees were warned
that the messages were "logged onto the system"
and were specifically limited in the types of
messages which could be sent.14 8
The opinion in Bohach additionally suggests
that in employment settings other than a police
station employees may be entitled to some expec-
tation of privacy in the messages.14 9 The court
points to the warnings by the Chief, the fact that
anyone could gain access to the system and the
messages without a password, the limited number
of available recipients (recipients must have an Al-
phapager), the ordinary and proper course of
business of the police station to record phone
conversation and the fact that the messages are re-
corded and stored as a matter of how the system
works to establish the "diminished" expectation of
privacy in the messages.' 5 0 It may follow in a dif-
ferent situation - where a recipient receives a
message at a specific address, where access to the
system is protected by a password, where messages
or communications from the company are not
routinely recorded or stored, but perhaps in fact
destroyed or assured by the company to be confi-
dential - that the employee may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Until the guarantee of privacy is achieved by
the development of technology, the courts need
to recognize the problem and outline a frame-
work which balances appropriately the privacy in-
terest in the messages with the employer's legiti-
mate interest in using technology to monitor
employee productivity and effectiveness. Em-
ployer invasion of employee privacy, however,
must be curbed.
149 Id. at 1235.
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